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Abstract
System level provenance is of widespread interest for applications
such as security enforcement and information protection. How-
ever, testing the correctness or completeness of provenance capture
tools is challenging and currently done manually. In some cases
there is not even a clear consensus about what behavior is correct.
We present an automated tool, ProvMark, that uses an existing
provenance system as a black box and reliably identifies the prove-
nance graph structure recorded for a given activity, by a reduction
to subgraph isomorphism problems handled by an external solver.
ProvMark is a beginning step in themuch needed area of testing and
comparing the expressiveness of provenance systems. We demon-
strate ProvMark’s usefuless in comparing three capture systems
with different architectures and distinct design philosophies.
1 Introduction
Data provenance is information about the origin, history, or deriva-
tion of some information [20]. It is commonly proposed as a basis
for reproducibility [28], dependability [3], and regulatory compli-
ance [30], and it is increasingly being used for security, through
forensic audit [33] or online dynamic detection of malicious be-
havior [16, 17]. To cater to the requirements of different use-cases,
there are many system-level provenance capture systems in the
literature, such as PASS [23], Hi-Fi [31], SPADE [12], OPUS [5],
LPM [6], Inspector [32], and CamFlow [26] covering a variety of
operating systems from Linux and BSD to Android and Windows.
Each system assembles low level system events into a high-level
provenance graph describing processes, system resources, and causal
relationships among them.
Often, such systems are described as capturing a complete and
accurate description of system activity. To date, the designers of
each such system have decided how to interpret these goals in-
dependently, making different choices regarding what activity to
record and how to represent it. Although some of these systems
do use standards such as W3C PROV [7] that establish a common
vocabulary for provenance-related data, such standards do not spec-
ify how to record operating system-level behaviour, or even when
such records are considered “accurate” or “complete”. Indeed, as we
shall see, in practice there is little consensus about how specific ac-
tivities (e.g., renaming a file) should be represented in a provenance
(a) SPADE
(b) CamFlow (c) OPUS
Figure 1. A rename system call, as recorded by three different
provenance recorders. Images are clickable links to full-size versions
with property labels.
graph. Additionally, different systems also work at different system
layers (e.g., kernel space vs. user space), so some information may
be unavailable to a given system.
To illustrate the problem, consider Figure 1, which shows three
provenance graph representations of the same rename system call,
as recorded by three different systems. These graphs clearly illus-
trate nontrivial structural differences in how rename is represented
as communications between processes (blue rectangles) and arti-
facts or resources (yellow ovals).
Security analysts, auditors, or regulators seeking to use these
systems face many challenges. Some of these challenges stem from
the inherent size and complexity of provenance graphs: it is not
unusual for a single day’s activity to generate graphs with millions
of nodes and edges. However, if important information is missing,
then these blind spots may render the records useless for their
intended purpose. For example, if a provenance capture system
does not record edges linking reads and writes to local sockets,
then attackers can evade notice by using these communication
channels. Such an omission could be due to a bug, but it could
also result from misconfiguration, silent failure, or an inherent
limitation of the recording system.
Provenance capture systems provide a broad-spectrum record-
ing service, separate from the monitored applications, but (like any
software system) they are not perfect, and can have their own bugs
or idiosyncrasies. In order to rely on them for critical applications
such as reproducible research, compliance monitoring, or intrusion
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detection, we need to be able to understand and validate their be-
havior. The strongest form of validation would consist of verifying
that the provenance records produced by a system are accurate rep-
resentations of the actual execution history of the system. However,
while there is now some work on formalizing operating system
kernels, such as seL4 [19] and HyperKernel [24], there are as yet
no complete formal models of mainstream operating systems such
as Linux. Developing such a model seems prerequisite to fully for-
malizing the accuracy, correctness, or completeness of provenance
systems.
If there is no immediate prospect of being able to formally define
and prove correctness for provenance recording systems, perhaps
we can at least make it easier to compare and understand their
behavior. We advocate a pragmatic approach as a first step toward
the goal of validating and testing provenance systems, which (fol-
lowing Chan et al. [9]) we call expressiveness benchmarking. In
contrast to performance benchmarking, which facilitates quantita-
tive comparisons of run time or other aspects of a system’s behavior,
expressiveness benchmarking facilitates qualitative comparisons of
how different provenance systems record the same activities. The
goal of such benchmarking is to answer questions such as:
• What does each node/edge in the graph tell us about actual
events? (correctness, accuracy)
• What information is guaranteed to be captured and what
are the blind spots? (completeness)
Previous work on comparing provenance representations has
been based on manual inspection to compare the graphs [9, 21],
but this manual approach is error prone and does not scale or allow
automated testing. However, automating this task faces numerous
challenges. It is difficult to configure some systems to record a
single process’s activity reproducibly. Provenance records include
volatile information such as timestamps and identifiers that vary
across runs, even when the underlying process is deterministic.
Furthermore, a process’s activity may include background process
start-up activity that needs to be filtered out.
Expressiveness benchmarking is a first (but important) step to-
wards understanding what it means for system provenance to be
complete and/or correct. It offers a systematic means to compare
different approaches. For example, how is a rename system call
represented, and how do nodes and edges correspond to processes,
files or file versions, or relationships among them? Are unsuccess-
ful calls recorded? Are records of multiple similar calls aggregated
together? By analyzing the same benchmark examples across differ-
ent provenance capture systems, we can compare the information
collected by different approaches to produce an understanding of
the relative capabilities of the systems and their suitability for dif-
ferent tasks. Expressiveness benchmarking also enables regression
testing since we can automatically compare benchmark graphs
before and after a system change to detect differences.
We present ProvMark, an automated system for provenance ex-
pressiveness benchmarking. ProvMark executes a given target op-
eration and records the resulting provenance captured by a given
system. Different runs of the same system can then be compared
to show whether each system records the target activity, and if so
how. Our main contributions are as follows:
• We show how to generalize from multiple runs to obtain
repeatable results, abstracting away volatile or transient data
such as timestamps or identifiers.
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Figure 2. Architecture summary of the SPADE, OPUS, and Cam-
Flow provenance recording systems
• We solve the required graph matching problems using an
external solver, based on Answer Set Programming (ASP), a
variation of logic programming.
• We evaluate ProvMark’s performance and effectiveness in
testing and comparing provenance systems, highlighting
several bugs or idiosyncrasies found so far.
ProvMark has been developed in consultation with developers of
three provenance recording systems, SPADE, OPUS and CamFlow,
several of whom are coauthors of this paper. They have validated
the results and in some cases helped adapt their systems to ease
benchmarking. The ProvMark system along with supplementary
results is publicly available at http://provmark2018.github.io [8].
2 Background and Related Work
Provenance [20] is a term originating in the art world. It refers
to the chain of ownership of a work of art, including its original
creator and each owner and location of the work from creation to
the present. In the digital realm, provenance refers to information
describing how an object came to be in its current form, typically in-
cluding any other data from which it was derived and a description
of the ways in which the input data was transformed to produce
the output data. It is usually collected to allow post-hoc analysis
to answer questions such as, “From where did this data come?”,
“On what objects does it depend?”, or “What programs were used
in its production?” Different applications of provenance will need
different data, and systems are either tailored for specific appli-
cations or have a mechanism for selective capture, so that a user
can obtain the right data for his/her intended use. Such flexibility
makes it difficult to determine which system or configuration is
most appropriate for a given task.
We apply ProvMark to three current provenance capture tools,
namely SPADEv2 [12], OPUS [5] and CamFlow [26]. All three sys-
tems run under Linux. There are many other provenance capture
systems. PASS is no longer maintained [23]; HiFi [31] was sub-
sumed by LPM [6], which is similar to CamFlow, but less portable
and not maintained. We focus on SPADE, OPUS and CamFlow as
representative, currently available examples. Figure 2 shows how
each system interacts with an application and the Linux kernel.
SPADE’s intended use is synthesizing provenance frommachines
in a distributed system, so it emphasizes relationships between pro-
cesses and digital objects across distributed hosts. Our analysis uses
SPADEv2 (tag tc-e3) with the Linux Audit Reporter [15], which
constructs a provenance graph using information from the Linux
audit system (including the Audit service, daemon, and dispatcher).
SPADE runs primarily in user space and provides many alternative
configurations, including filtering and transforming the data, for
example, to enable versioning or finer-grained tracking of I/O or
network events, or to make use of information in procfs to obtain in-
formation about processes that were started before SPADE. We use
a baseline configuration that collects data from the Audit Daemon
(auditd), without versioning.
OPUS focuses on file system operations, attempting to abstract
such operations andmake the provenance collection process portable.
It wraps standard C library calls with hooks that record provenance.
The OPUS system is especially concerned with versioning support
and proposes a Provenance Versioning Model, analogous to mod-
els previously introduced in the context of PASS [22] and later
SPADE [13]. OPUS also runs in user space, but it relies on inter-
cepting calls to a dynamically linked library (e.g., libc). Therefore,
it is blind to activities that do not go through an intercepted dy-
namic library, but can observe the C library calls and userspace
abstractions such as file descriptors.
CamFlow’s emphasis is sustainability through modularity, in-
terfacing with the kernel via Linux Security Modules (LSM). The
LSM hooks capture provenance, but then dispatch it to user space,
via relayfs, for further processing. It strives for completeness and
has its roots in Information Flow Control systems [29]. By default,
CamFlow captures all system activity visible to LSM and relates
different executions to form a single provenance graph; as we shall
see, this leads to some complications for repeatable benchmarking.
SPADE can also be configured to support similar behavior, while
CamFlow can also be used (instead of Linux Audit) to report prove-
nance to SPADE. Compared to SPADE and OPUS, which both run
primarily in user space, CamFlow [26] monitors activity and gen-
erates the provenance graph from inside the kernel, via LSM and
NetFilter hooks. This means the correctness of the provenance data
depends on the LSM operation. As the rules are set directly on the
LSM hooks themselves, which are already intended to monitor all
security-sensitive operations, CamFlow can monitor and/or record
all sensitive operations. CamFlow allows users to set filtering rules
when collecting provenance.
Prior work [9, 21] on comparing different provenance systems
has followed a manual approach. For example, the Provenance
Challenge [21] proposed a set of scientific computation scenarios
and solicited submissions illustrating how different capture systems
handle these scenarios, to facilitate (manual) comparison of systems.
More recently, Chan et al. proposed a pragmatic, but also manual,
approach [9] to benchmarking OS-level provenance tracking at the
level of individual system calls. However, these manual approaches
are error-prone and not scalable. It is also worth mentioning that
Pasquier et al. [27] perform static analysis showing a conservative
over-approximation of the CamFlow provenance recorded for each
call. However, these results are not yet automatically compared
with actual run-time behavior.
Provenance expressiveness benchmarking is also related to the
emerging topic of forensic-ready systems [2, 25, 34]. Work in this
area considers how to add logging to an existing system to detect
known classes of behaviors, particularly for legal evidence or reg-
ulatory compliance, or how to advise developers on how to add
appropriate logging to systems in development. The provenance
collection systems above strive for completeness so that previously-
unseen behaviors can be detected, and proactively record informa-
tion so that user applications do not need to be modified.
3 System Design and Methodology
ProvMark is intended to automatically identify the (usually small)
subgraph of a provenance graph that is recorded for a given target
activity. Target activities could consist of individual system calls (or
syscalls), sequences of syscalls, or more general (e.g., concurrent)
processes. For the moment, we consider the simplest case of a single
syscall, but the same techniques generalize to deterministic sequen-
tial target activities; handling concurrency and nondeterminism
are beyond the scope of this paper.
We call the targeted system call the target call and the corre-
sponding subgraph the target graph. Naively, one might proceed
by writing a simple C program for each target system call that just
performs that call and nothing else. However, starting and ending
a process creates considerable “boilerplate” provenance, including
calls such as fork, execve, and exit, as well as accesses to pro-
gram files and libraries and, sometimes, memory mapping calls.
Furthermore, some target calls require other prerequisite calls to be
performed first. For example, analyzing a read or close system call
requires first performing an open. Process startup and prerequisite
calls are both examples of background activity that we would like
to elide.
In each benchmark, we use an #ifdef TARGET CPP directive
to identify the target behavior of interest. ProvMark generates
two executables for each such benchmark: a foreground program
that includes all code in the benchmark program, including the
target and any context needed for it to execute, and a background
program that contains the background activities. The two binaries
are almost identical; the difference between the resulting graphs
should precisely capture the target behavior.
ProvMark includes a script for each syscall that generates and
compiles the appropriate C executables and prepares a staging
directory in which they will be executed with any needed setup,
for example, first creating a file to run an unlink system call. We
constructed these scripts manually since different system calls re-
quire different setup. The following code snippet illustrates the
background program (including open) needed for the target close
syscall (with #ifdef surrounding the target):
// close.c
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
void main() {
int id=open("test.txt", O_RDWR);
#ifdef TARGET
close(id);
#endif
}
Figure 3 provides an overview of ProvMark, which is composed
of four subsystems: (1) recording, (2) transformation, (3) general-
ization, and (4) comparison. Users can select which provenance
capture system to use, which benchmark to run, and other configu-
ration settings, such as the number of trials. Before presenting the
details of the four subsystems, we outline some common use cases
for ProvMark.
bg1
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bg1 Datalog
bg2 Datalog
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Figure 3. ProvMark system overview. The recording stage (1) uses one of the provenance recorders to compute background graphs bд1,bд2
and foreground graphs f д1, f д2. (The same recorder is used for all four graphs.) The transformation stage (2) maps these graphs to a uniform
Datalog format. The generalization stage (3) identifies the common structure of bд1 and bд2, resulting in bд, and likewise f д1 and f д2 are
generalized to f д. Finally, bд and f д are compared (4); structure corresponding to bд in f д is removed, yielding the benchmark result.
3.1 Use Cases
People are beginning to build critical distributed applications, partic-
ularly security applications, using system-level provenance. How-
ever, it is difficult for them to know how to interpret results or
implement queries to detect activity on different systems. Both
potential users and developers of all three considered provenance
recording tools have participated in the design of ProvMark. To
clarify when, and to whom, ProvMark is useful, in this section
we outline several common use cases. In each case, ProvMark au-
tomates a central, labor-intensive step: namely, running tools to
extract provenance, graphs and analyzing the graphs produced by a
tool to identify a target activity. The first two use cases are real (al-
beit lightly fictionalized) situations where we have used ProvMark.
The other two are more speculative, but illustrate how ProvMark
could be used for testing or exploration.
Tracking failed calls Alice, a security analyst, wants to know
which provenance recorders track syscalls that fail due to access
control violations, since these calls may be an indication of an attack
or surveillance attempt. She can write small benchmark programs
that capture various access control failure scenarios; most only take
a few minutes to write, by modifying other, similar benchmarks
for successful calls. Once this is done, ProvMark can run all of
them to produce benchmark results. For example, Alice considers
what happens if a non-privileged user unsuccessfully attempts to
overwrite /etc/passwd by renaming another file.
By default SPADE installs Linux Audit rules that only report on
successful system calls, so SPADE records no information in this
case. OPUS monitors system calls via intercepting C library calls, so
it knows whether a call is being attempted, and typically generates
some graph structure even for unsuccessful calls. For example, the
result of a failed rename call has the same structure as shown in
Figure 1, but with a different return value property of -1 instead
of 0. Finally, CamFlow can in principle monitor failed system calls,
particularly involving permission checks, but does not do so in this
case. Alice concludes that for her application, OPUS may provide
the best solution, but resolves to discuss this issue with the SPADE
and CamFlow developers as well.
Configuration validation Bob, a system administrator, wants
to make sure that an installation of SPADE is configured correctly to
match a security policy. SPADE (like the other systems) has several
configuration parameters, to allow greater or lesser levels of detail,
coalescing similar operations (such as repeated reads or writes), or
enabling/disabling versioning. These also affect performance and
system overhead, so Bob wants to ensure that enough information
is recorded to enable successful audits, while minimizing system
load.
Bob can use ProvMark to benchmark alternative configurations
of SPADE. For example, SPADE provides a flag simplify that is
enabled by default. Disabling simplify causes setresgid and
setresuid (among others) to be explicitly monitored, and Bob
wants to ensure these calls are tracked. However, on doing so, Bob
also uncovered a minor bug: when simplify is disabled, one of the
properties of a background edge is initialized to a random value,
which shows up in the benchmark as a disconnected subgraph. The
bug was reported to the SPADE developers and quickly fixed.
SPADE also provides various filters and transformers which per-
form pre-processing or post-processing of the stored provenance
respectively. Bob also experimented with one of SPADE’s filters,
IORuns, which controls whether runs of similar read or write oper-
ations are coalesced into a single edge. Surprisingly, Bob found that
in the benchmarked version of SPADE, enabling this filter had no
effect. This turned out to be due to an inconsistency in the property
names used by the filter vs. those generated by SPADE. This has
also now been fixed.
Regression testing Charlie, a developer of provenance recording
tool XYZTrace, wants to be able to document the level of com-
pleteness of XYZTrace to (potentially skeptical) users. ProvMark
can be used for regression testing, by recording the graphs pro-
duced in a given benchmarking run, and comparing them with
the results of future runs, using the same code for graph isomor-
phism testing ProvMark already uses during benchmarking. Charlie
writes a simple script that stores the benchmark graphs (as Datalog)
from previous runs, and whenever the system is changed, a new
benchmarking run is performed and the results compared with the
previous ones. When differences are detected, if the changes are
expected then the new version of the graph replaces the old one; if
the changes are unexpected, this is investigated as a potential bug.
Suspicious activity detection Dora, a security researcher, wants
to identify patterns in provenance graphs that are indicative of a
potential attack on the system. She compiles a set of scripts that
carry out different kinds of attacks, and configures CamFlow on a
virtual machine. She is particularly interested in detecting privilege
escalation events where an attacker is able to gain access to new
resources by subverting a privileged process. She instruments the
scripts to treat the privilege escalation step as the “target activity”.
Using ProvMark, Dora can obtain example provenance graphs that
include the target activity or exclude it. If the graphs are not too
large (e.g. hundreds rather than thousands of nodes), ProvMark’s de-
fault behavior will also be able to compute the differences between
the graphs with and without the target activity.
3.2 Recording
The recording subsystem runs the provenance capture tools on test
programs. This subsystem first prepares a staging directory that
provides a consistent environment for test execution. The recording
subsystem then starts the provenance capture tool with appropriate
settings, captures the provenance generated by the tool, and stops
the tool afterwards.
The recording subsystem is the only one to interact directly with
the target provenance capture tools. For each tool, we implemented
a script that configures the tool to capture the provenance of a
specific process, rather than recording all contemporaneous system
events. Recording multiple runs of the same process using CamFlow
was challenging in earlier versions because CamFlow only serialized
nodes and edges once, when first seen. The current version (0.4.5)
provides a workaround to this problem that re-serializes the needed
structures when they are referenced later. We also modified its
configuration slightly to avoid tracking ProvMark’s own behavior.
We otherwise use the default configuration for each system; we
refer to these configurations as the baseline configurations.
The recording subsystem is used to record provenance graphs
for the foreground and background variants of each benchmark.
Provenance can include transient data that varies across runs, such
as timestamps, so we typically record multiple runs of each program
and filter out the transient information in a later generalization
stage, described below.
Some of the provenance collecting tools were originally designed
to record whole system provenance. The tools start recording when
the machine is started and only stops when the machine is shut
down. This behaviour ensures that provenance recording covers
the entire operating system session. As we need to obtain repeat-
able results from several recording attempts for generalization and
benchmark generation, we need to restart the recording section
multiple times during the provenance collection. This may interfere
with the results of some tools as they are not originally designed
for frequent restarting of recording sessions. Thus the recording
subsystem aims to manage the collecting tools by inserting and
Listing 1. Datalog Graph Format
Node n<gid>(<nodeID>,<label>)
Edge e<gid>(<edgeID>,<srcID>,<tgtID>,<label>)
Property p<gid>(<nodeID/edgeID>,<key>,<value>)
managing timeouts between the sessions. For example, we usually
obtain stable results from SPADE by inserting timeouts to wait
for successful completion of SPADE’s graph generation process;
even so, we sometimes stop too early and obtain inconsistent re-
sults leading to mismatched graphs. Similarly, using CamFlow, we
sometimes experience small variations in the size or structure of
the results for reasons we have not been able to determine. In both
cases we deal with this by running a larger number of trials and
retaining the two smallest consistent results (as discussed later). For
OPUS, any two runs are usually consistent, but starting OPUS and
loading data into or out of Neo4j are time-consuming operations.
3.3 Transformation
Different systems output their provenance graphs in different for-
mats. For example, SPADE supports Graphviz DOT format and
Neo4J storage (among others), OPUS also supports Neo4J storage,
and CamFlow supports W3C PROV-JSON [18] as well as a number
of other storage or stream processing backends. CamFlow also can
be used instead of Linux Audit as a reporter to SPADE, though we
have not yet experimented with this configuration. To streamline
the remaining stages, we translate these three formats to a com-
mon representation. Unlike the recording stage, this stage really is
straightforward, but we will describe the common format in detail
because it is important for understanding the remaining stages.
The common target format is a logical representation of property
graphs, in which nodes and edges can have labels as well as associ-
ated properties (key-value dictionaries). Specifically, given a set Σ
of node and edge labels, Γ of property keys, and D of data values,
we consider property graphsG = (V ,E, src, tдt , lab,prop) where V
is a set of vertex identifiers and E a set of edge identifiers; these are
disjoint (V ∩ E = ∅). Further, src, tдt : E → V maps each edge e to
its source and target nodes, respectively, lab : V ∪E → Σmaps each
node or edge x to its label lab(x) ∈ Σ, and prop : (V ∪ E) × Γ → D
is a partial function such that for a given node or edge x , then
prop(x ,p) (if defined) is the value for property p ∈ Γ. In practice, Σ,
Γ and D are each sets of strings.
For provenance graphs, following the W3C PROV vocabulary,
the node labels are typically entity, activity and agent, edge labels
are typically relations such as wasGeneratedBy and used, and prop-
erties are either PROV-specific property names or domain-specific
ones, and their values are typically strings. However, our repre-
sentation does not assume the labels and properties are known in
advance; it works with those produced by the tested system.
We represent property graphs as sets of logical facts using a
Prolog-like syntax called Datalog [1], which is often used to repre-
sent relational data in logic programming (as well as databases [1]
and networking [14]).
The generic form of the Datalog graph format we use is shown as
Listing 1. We assume a fixed string gid used to uniquely identify a
given graph as part of its node, edge and label relation names. Each
node v ∈ V is represented as a fact nдid (v, lab(v)). Likewise, each
edge e = (v,w) ∈ E is represented as a fact eдid (e, src(e), tдt(e), lab(e)).
Type: File
Userid: 1
Name: text
n1
Type: File
Userid: 1
Name: text
n1
Type: 
Process
n2
e1
Type: Used
g2g1
Figure 4. Sample Graphs
Listing 2. Datalog Format for Figure 4
ng1(n1,"File").
pg1(n1,"Userid","1").
pg1(n1,"Name","text").
ng2(n1,"File").
ng2(n2,"Process").
pg2(n1,"Userid","1").
eg2(e1,n1,n2,"Used").
pg2(n1,"Name","text").
Finally, if a node or edge x has property p with value s , we represent
this with the fact pдid (x ,p, s). Two sample graphs are shown in
Figure 4 and their Datalog representations in Listing 2.
All the remaining stages, including the final result, work on the
Datalog graph representation, so these stages are independent of
the provenance capture tool and its output format. The Datalog
representation can easily be visualized.
3.4 Graph Generalization
The third subsystem performs graph generalization. Recall that the
recording stage produces several graphs for a given test program.
We wish to identify a single, representative and general graph for
each test program. To formalize these notions, we adapt the notion
of graph isomorphism to property graphs:G1 is isomorphic toG2 if
there is an invertible function h : V1 ∪ E1 → V2 ∪ E2 such that
1. h(src1(e)) = src2(h(e)) and h(tдt1(e)) = tдt2(h(e)), i.e. h pre-
serves edge relationships
2. lab1(x) = lab2(h(x)), i.e. h preserves node and edge labels
3. prop1(x ,k,v) = prop2(h(x),k,v), i.e. h preserves properties.
Moreover, we say that G1 and G2 are similar if only the first two
conditions hold, that is, if G1 and G2 have the same shape but
possibly different properties.
We assume that over sufficiently many recording trials, there
will be at least two representative ones, which are similar to each
other. Identifying two representative runs is complicated by the
fact that there might be multiple pairs of similar graphs. We discuss
a strategy for identifying an appropriate pair below. To obtain two
representative graphs, we first consider all of the trial runs and
partition them into similarity classes. We first discard all graphs
that are only similar to themselves, and consider these to be failed
runs. Among the remaining similarity classes, we choose a pair
of graphs whose size is smallest. Picking the two largest graphs
also seems to work; the choice seems arbitrary. However, picking
the largest background graph and the smallest foreground graph
leads to failure if the extra background structure is not found in
the foreground, while making the opposite choice leads to extra
structure being found in the difference.
Listing 3. Graph similarity
{h(X,Y) : n2(Y,_)} = 1 :- n1(X,_).
{h(X,Y) : n1(X,_)} = 1 :- n2(Y,_).
{h(X,Y) : e2(Y,_,_,_)} = 1 :- e1(X,_,_,_).
{h(X,Y) : e1(X,_,_,_)} = 1 :- e2(Y,_,_,_).
:- X <> Y, h(X,Z), h(Y,Z).
:- X <> Y, h(Z,Y), h(Z,X).
:- n1(X,L), h(X,Y), not n2(Y,L).
:- n2(Y,L), h(X,Y), not n1(X,L).
:- e1(E1,_,_,L), h(E1,E2), not e2(E2,_,_,L).
:- e2(E2,_,_,L), h(E1,E2), not e1(E1,_,_,L).
:- e1(E1,X,_,_), h(E1,E2), e2(E2,Y,_,_), not h(X,Y).
:- e1(E1,_,X,_), h(E1,E2), e2(E2,_,Y,_), not h(X,Y).
Given two similar graphs, the generalization stage identifies
the property values that are consistent across the two graphs and
removes the transient ones. The generalization stage searches for
a matching of nodes and edges of the two graphs that minimizes
the number of different properties. We assume that the differences
are transient data and discard them. We would like to minimize
the number of differences, that is, match as many properties as
possible.
Similarity and generalization are instances of the graph iso-
morphism problem, whose status (in P or NP-complete) is un-
known [4]. We solve these problems using an Answer Set Program-
ming (ASP) [11] specification that defines the desired matching
between the two graphs. ASP is a decidable form of logic program-
ming that combines a high-level logical specification language with
efficient search and optimization techniques analogous to SAT solv-
ing or integer linear programming. An answer set program specifies
a set of possible models, which correspond to solutions to a prob-
lem. The specification is a collection of logical formulas that define
when a model is a possible solution. In our setting, the models
consist of matching relations between two graphs, satisfying the
requirements of graph similarity. ASP is well-suited to this problem
because the graphs and specification can be represented concisely,
and (as we shall see) the ASP solver can efficiently find solutions.
The problem specification is a logic program defining when a
binary relation forms an isomorphism between the graphs. The code
in Listing 3 defines graph isomorphism in ASP. ASP specifications
consist of rules that constrain the possible solution set. The first
four lines specify that h can relate any node inG1 to any node inG2
and vice versa, and similarly for edges. The next two lines constrain
h to be a 1-1 function. (Rules of the form :- A,B,C. can be read as
“It cannot be the case that A, B, and C hold”.) The remaining three
pairs of lines specify that h must preserve node and edge labels and
the source and targets of edges.
This specification can be solved using clingo, an efficient ASP
solver [11]. As ASP is a kind of logic programming, it helps Prov-
Mark to determine an optimal matching solution among two graphs
by searching for a model that satisfies the specification. We use
the resulting matching to determine which properties are common
across both graphs and discard the others. We perform generaliza-
tion independently on the foreground and background graphs. The
Listing 4. Approximate subgraph isomorphism
{h(X,Y) : n2(Y,_)} = 1 :- n1(X,_).
{h(X,Y) : e2(Y,_,_,_)} = 1 :- e1(X,_,_,_).
:- X <> Y, h(X,Z), h(Y,Z).
:- X <> Y, h(Z,Y), h(Z,X).
:- n1(X,L), h(X,Y), not n2(Y,L).
:- e1(E1,_,_,L), h(E1,E2), not e2(E2,_,_,L).
:- e1(E1,X,_,_), h(E1,E2), e2(E2,Y,_,_), not h(X,Y).
:- e1(E1,_,X,_), h(E1,E2), e2(E2,_,Y,_), not h(X,Y).
cost(X,K,0) :- p1(X,K,V), h(X,Y), p2(Y,K,V).
cost(X,K,1) :- p1(X,K,V), h(X,Y), p2(Y,K,W), V <> W.
cost(X,K,1) :- p1(X,K,V), h(X,Y), not p2(Y,K,_).
#minimize { PC,X,K : cost(X,K,PC) }.
outputs of this stage are the two generalized graphs representing
the invariant activity of the foreground and background programs
respectively.
3.5 Graph Comparison
The fourth and last subsystem is graph comparison. Its purpose is
to match the background graph to a subgraph of the foreground
graph; the unmatched part of the foreground graph corresponds to
the target activity.
Because provenance recording is generally monotonic (append-
only), we expect that the generalized provenance graph for the
background program is a subgraph of the generalized provenance
graph for the foreground program, so there should be a one-to-one
matching from the nodes and edges in the background graph to
the foreground graph. This graph matching problem is a variant
of the subgraph isomorphism problem, a classical NP-complete
problem [10]. We again solve these problems using ASP, taking ad-
vantage of the fact that ASP solvers can search for optimal solutions
according to some cost model.
Given two graphs, G1 and G2, the solver finds a matching from
the nodes and edges of G1 to those of G2 that identifies a subgraph
of G2 isomorphic to G1 and minimizes the number of mismatched
properties. Listing 4 shows the approximate subgraph optimization
problem specification. It is related to graph similarity, but only
requires nodes/edges in G1 to be matched to one in G2 and not the
reverse. Additionally, the last four lines define the cost of a match-
ing as the number of properties present in G1 with no matching
property in G2, and this cost is to be minimized.
We again use the clingo solver to find an optimal matching.
Once we have found such a matching, the graph comparison sub-
system subtracts the matched nodes and edges in the background
activity from the foreground graph. This is essentially a set differ-
ence operation between the nodes and edges of the graphs, but we
also retain any nodes that are sources or targets of edges in the
difference; these are visualized as green or gray dummy nodes.
4 Demonstration
We present a demonstration of using ProvMark to investigate and
compare the behavior of the different capture systems. These results
1 Files close, creat, dup[2,3], [sym]link[at],
mknod[at], open[at], [p]read,
rename[at], [f]truncate, unlink[at],
[p]write
2 Processes clone, execve, exit, [v]fork, kill
3 Permissions [f]chmod[at], [f]chown[at],
set[re[s]]gid, set[re[s]]uid
4 Pipes pipe[2], tee
Table 1. Benchmarked syscalls
pertain to SPADEv2 (tag tc-e3) and OPUS version 0.1.0.26 running
on Ubuntu 16.04 and CamFlow version 0.4.5 running on Fedora 27.
Unix-like operating systems support over three hundred system
calls. We focus on a subset of 22 common system call families shown
in Table 1, including themost common file and processmanagement
calls. We prepared benchmarking programs for these syscalls, along
with tests for each one to ensure that the target behavior was
performed successfully. Note that the same system call may display
different behavior using different parameters and system states; we
focus on common-case behavior here, but handling other scenarios
such as failure cases is straightforward as outlined in Section 3.1.
We cannot show all of the benchmark graphs, nor can we show
the graphs at a readable size; the full results are available for inspec-
tion online [8]. Table 2 summarizes the results. In this table, “ok”
means the graph is correct (according to the system’s developers),
and “empty” means the foreground and background graphs were
similar and so the target activity was undetected. The table includes
notes indicating the reason for emptiness. Also, Table 3 shows se-
lected graphs (again, images are links to scalable online images
with full details) for the benchmark result. Although the property
keys and values are omitted, we can compare the graph structure
and see that the three tools generate very different structures for
the same system calls. This demonstrates one of the important mo-
tivations for expressiveness benchmarking. In these graph results,
the yellow ovals represent artifacts which includes files, pipes or
other resources. The blue rectangles represent processes involved in
the named system calls. The green or gray ovals represent dummy
nodes which stand for pre-existing parts of the graph. We retain
these dummy nodes to make the result a complete graph.
In this section we present and discuss the benchmarking outputs
for several representative syscalls, highlighting minor bugs found
and cases where the behavior of individual tools or the variation
among different tools was surprising.
4.1 File system
File system calls such as creat, open, close are generally covered
well by all of the tools, but they each take somewhat different
approaches to representing even simple behavior. For example, for
the open call, SPADE adds a single node and edge for the new
file, while CamFlow creates a node for the file object, a node for
its path, and several edges linking them to each other and the
opening process, and OPUS creates four new nodes including two
nodes corresponding to the file. On the other hand, reads and writes
appear similar in both SPADE and CamFlow, while by default, OPUS
does not record file reads or writes. For close, CamFlow records
the underlying kernel data structures eventually being freed, but
ProvMark does not reliably observe this.
Group syscall SPADE OPUS CamFlow
1 close ok ok empty (LP)
1 creat ok ok ok
1 dup empty (SC) ok empty (NR)
1 dup2 empty (SC) ok empty (NR)
1 dup3 empty (SC) ok empty (NR)
1 link ok ok ok
1 linkat ok ok ok
1 symlink ok ok empty (NR)
1 symlinkat ok ok empty (NR)
1 mknod empty (NR) ok empty (NR)
1 mknodat empty (NR) empty (NR) empty (NR)
1 open ok ok ok
1 openat ok ok ok
1 read ok empty (NR) ok
1 pread ok empty (NR) ok
1 rename ok ok ok
1 renameat ok ok ok
1 truncate ok ok ok
1 ftruncate ok ok ok
1 unlink ok ok ok
1 unlinkat ok ok ok
1 write ok empty (NR) ok
1 pwrite ok empty (NR) ok
2 clone ok empty (NR) ok
2 execve ok ok ok
2 exit empty (LP) empty (LP) empty (LP)
2 fork ok ok ok
2 kill empty (LP) empty (LP) empty (LP)
2 vfork ok (DV) ok ok
3 chmod ok ok ok
3 fchmod ok empty (NR) ok
3 fchmodat ok ok ok
3 chown empty (NR) ok ok
3 fchown empty (NR) empty (NR) ok
3 fchownat empty (NR) ok ok
3 setgid ok ok ok
3 setregid ok ok ok
3 setresgid empty (SC) empty (NR) ok
3 setuid ok ok ok
3 setreuid ok ok ok
3 setresuid ok (SC) empty (NR) ok
4 pipe empty (NR) ok empty (NR)
4 pipe2 empty (NR) ok empty (NR)
4 tee empty (NR) empty (NR) ok
Note Meaning
NR Behavior not recorded (by default configuration)
SC Only state changes monitored
LP Limitation in ProvMark
DV Disconnected vforked process
Table 2. Summary of validation results
The dup[2,3] syscall duplicates a file descriptor so that the
process can use two different file descriptors to access the same
open file. SPADE and CamFlow do not record this call directly, but
the changes to the process’s file descriptor state can affect future file
system calls that are monitored. OPUS does record dup[2,3]. The
two added nodes are not directly connected to each other, but are
connected to the same process node in the underlying graph. One
component records the system call itself and the other one records
the creation of a new resource (the duplicated file descriptor).
The link[at] call is recorded by all three systems but symlink[at]
is not recorded by CamFlow 0.4.5. Likewise, mknod is only recorded
by OPUS, and mknodat is not recorded by any of the systems.
The rename[at] call, as shown in the introduction, illustrates
how the three systems record different graph structure for this
operation. SPADE represents a rename using two nodes for the new
and old filenames, with edges linking them to each other and to the
process that performed the rename. OPUS creates around a dozen
nodes, including nodes corresponding to the rename call itself and
the new and old filename. CamFlow represents a rename as adding
a new path associated with the file object; the old path does not
appear in the benchmark result.
4.2 Process management
The processmanagement operations start processes ([v]fork, clone),
replace a process’s memory space with a new executable and exe-
cute it (execve), or terminate a process (kill, exit).
Process creation and initialization calls are generally monitored
by all three tools, except that OPUS does not appear to monitor
clone. Inspecting the results manually shows significant differ-
ences, however. For example, the SPADE benchmark graph for
execve is large, but has just a few nodes for OPUS and CamFlow.
On the other hand, the fork and vfork graphs are small for SPADE
and CamFlow and large for OPUS. This may indicate the different
perspectives of these tools: SPADE relies on the activity reported
by Linux Audit, while OPUS relies on intercepting C library calls
outside the kernel.
Another interesting observation is that the SPADE benchmark
results for fork and vfork differ. Specifically, for vfork, SPADE
represents the forked process as a disconnected activity node, i.e.
there is no graph structure connecting the parent and child process.
This is because Linux Audit reports system calls on exit, while
the parent process that called vfork is suspended until the child
process exits. SPADE sees the vforked child process in the log
executing its own syscalls before it actually sees the vfork that
created the child process.
The exit and kill calls are not detected because they deviate
from the assumptions our approach is based on. A process always
has an implicit exit at the end, while killing a process means that it
does not terminate normally. Thus, the exit and kill benchmarks
are all empty. We plan to consider a more sophisticated approach
that can benchmark these calls in future work.
4.3 Permissions
We included syscalls that change file permissions (such as [f]chown[at],
[f]chmod[at]) or process permissions in this group. According to
its documentation, SPADE currently records [f]chmod[at] but not
[f]chown[at]. OPUS does not monitor fchmod or fchown because
from its perspective these calls only perform read/write activity
and do not affect the process’s file descriptor state, so as for other
read/write activity OPUS does not record anything in its default
configuration. CamFlow records all of these operations.
In its default configuration, SPADE does not explicitly record
setresuid or setresgid, but it does monitor changes to these
process attributes and records observed changes. Our benchmark
result for setresuid is nonempty, reflecting an actual change of
Table 3. Example benchmark results for SPADE, OPUS and CamFlow. Images are links to scalable online images with property labels.
open read write dup setuid setresuid
SPADE Empty
OPUS Empty Empty Empty
CamFlow n12
n8
Empty n8
user id, while our benchmark for setresgid just sets the group id
attribute to its current value, and so this activity is not noticed by
SPADE. OPUS also does not track these two calls, while CamFlow
again tracks all of them.
4.4 Pipes
Pipes provide efficient interprocess communication. The pipe[2,3]
call creates a pipe, which can be read or written using standard file
system calls, and tee duplicates information from one pipe into
another without consuming it. Of the three systems, only OPUS
records pipe[2,3] calls, while only CamFlow currently records
tee.
5 System Evaluation
In this section, we will evaluate ProvMark. We claim that the Prov-
Mark system makes it easy to test and compare the behavior of
provenance tracking systems and to assess their completeness and
correctness. The previous section gave some evidence that the re-
sults are useful for understanding the different systems and what
information they do or do not collect. In this section, we will eval-
uate the performance and extensibility of ProvMark itself. For a
fair comparison, all the experiments are done in a virtual machine
with 1 virtual CPU and 4GB of virtual memory. Dependencies for
all three provenance collecting tools, including Neo4J and some
needed Python libraries, are also installed. All virtual machines
were hosted on a Intel i5-4570 3.2GHz with 8GB RAM running
Scientific Linux 7.5.
5.1 System Performance
We first discuss the performance of the ProvMark system. Some
performance overhead is acceptable for a benchmarking or testing
tool; however, we need to establish that ProvMark’s strategy for
solving NP-complete subgraph isomorphism problems is effective
in practice (i.e. takes minutes rather than days). In this section,
we will show that the extra work done by ProvMark to generate
benchmarks from the original provenance result is acceptable.
We first report measurements of the recording time. Since the
number of trials varies, we report the average time needed per trial.
For SPADE, recording took approximately 20s per trial. For OPUS,
the recording time was around 28s per trial, and for CamFlow each
trial took around 10s. We wish to emphasize that the recording
time results are not representative of the recording times of these
systems in normal operation — they include repeatedly starting,
stopping, and waiting for output to be flushed, and the waiting
times are intentionally conservative to avoid garbled results. No
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Figure 5. Timing results: SPADE+Graphviz
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Figure 7. Timing results: CamFlow+ProvJson
conclusions about the relative performance of the recording tools
when used as intended should be drawn.
In Figures 5–7, we summarize the time needed for ProvMark to
run five representative syscalls using SPADE, OPUS, and CamFlow
respectively. The bars are divided into three portions, representing
the time needed for the transformation, generalization and compar-
ison subsystems. Note that the x-axes are not all to the same scale:
in particular the transformation, generalization and comparison
times for OPUS are much higher than for the other tools because of
database startup and access time, and because the graphs extracted
from the database are larger. Modifying OPUS to circumvent the
database and serialize provenance directly would avoid this cost,
but we have chosen to use the tools as they are to the greatest
extent possible.
From the data in Figures 5–7 we can see that the transformation
stage is typically themost time-consuming part. The transformation
stage maps the different provenance output formats to Datalog
format. The transformation time for OPUS is much longer than for
the other two systems. This appears to be because OPUS produces
larger graphs (including recording environment variables), and
extracting them involves running Neo4j queries, which also has a
one-time JVM warmup and database initialization cost.
The time required for the generalization stage depends mainly
on the number of elements (nodes and edges) in the graph, since
this stage matches elements in pairs of graphs to find an isomorphic
graph matching. As we can see from the results, the generalization
of OPUS graphs again takes significantly longer than for SPADE
and CamFlow, probably because the graphs are larger. For SPADE,
generalization of the execve benchmark takes much longer than
for other calls (though still only a few seconds).
The time required for the comparison stage is usually less than
for generalization (recall that in generalization we process two pairs
of graphs whereas in comparison we just compare the background
and foreground graphs). Comparison of OPUS graphs again takes
longest, while comparison of CamFlow graphs again takes slightly
longer than for SPADE, perhaps because of the larger number of
properties.
In general, we can conclude that the time needed for ProvMark’s
transformation, generalization, and comparison stages is acceptable
compared with the time needed for recording. Most benchmarks
complete within a few minutes at most, though some that produce
larger target graphs take considerably longer; thus, at this point
running all of the benchmarks takes a few hours. This seems like an
acceptable price to pay for increased confidence in these systems,
and while there is clearly room for improvement, this compares
favorably with manual analysis, which is tedious and would take
a skilled user several hours. In addition, we have monitored the
memory usage and found that ProvMark never used more than 75%
of memory on a 4GB virtual machine, indicating memory was not
a bottleneck.
5.2 Scalability
Our experiments so far concentrated on benchmarking one syscall
at a time. The design of ProvMark allows arbitrary activity as the tar-
get action, including sequences of syscalls. As mentioned above, we
can simply identify a target action sequence using #ifdef TARGET
in order to let ProvMark generate background and foreground pro-
grams respectively.
Of course, if the target activity consists of multiple syscalls,
the time needed for ProvMark to process results and solve the re-
sulting subgraph isomorphism problems will surely increase. The
generated provenance graph will also increase in size and number
of elements. The NP-complete complexity of sub-graph isomor-
phism means that in the worst case, the time needed to solve larger
problem instances could increase exponentially. This section in-
vestigates the scalability of ProvMark when the size of the target
action increases.
In figure 8-10, the charts show the time needed for the three pro-
cessing subsystems of ProvMark in handling some scalability test
cases on SPADE, OPUS and CamFlow respectively. The scalability
test cases range from scale1 to scale8. In test case scale1, the target
action sequence is simply a creation of a file and another deletion
of the newly created file. In test case scale2, scale4 and scale8, the
same target action is repeated twice, four times, and eight times
respectively. The results show that the time needed initially grows
slowly for SPADE, but by scale8 the time almost doubles compared
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4
scale1
scale2
scale4
scale8
Time (seconds)
Transformation
Generalization
Comparison
Figure 8. Scalability results: SPADE+Graphviz
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Figure 10. Scalability results: CamFlow+ProvJson
to scale1. For OPUS, the time increases are dwarfed by the high
overhead of transformation, which includes the one-time Neo4j
startup and access costs as discussed above. For CamFlow, the time
needed approximately doubles at each scale factor. Although fur-
ther scalability experiments are needed to consider much larger
graph or benchmark sizes, these experiments do demonstrate that
ProvMark can currently handle short sequences of 10-20 syscalls
without problems.
5.3 Modularity and Extensibility
ProvMark was designed with extensibility in mind. Only the first
two stages (recording and generalization) depend on the details
of the recording system being benchmarked, so to support a new
system, it suffices to implement an additional recording module that
uses the new system to record provenance for a test executable, and
(if needed) an additional translation module that maps its results
to Datalog.
As discussed earlier, it was non-trivial to develop recording mod-
ules for the three systems that produce reliable results. In particular,
supporting CamFlow required several iterations and discussion
with its developers, which have resulted in changes to CamFlow
to accommodate the needs of benchmarking. This architecture
has been refined through experience with multiple versions of the
SPADE and CamFlow systems, and we have generally found the
changes needed to ProvMark to maintain compatibility with new
versions to be minor. Developing new recording modules ought to
be straightforward for systems that work in a similar way to one
of the three currently supported.
If a provenance tool generates data in a format not currently
supported by ProvMark, an additional module for handling this type
of provenance data is needed. The need for new transformations
should decrease over time as more tools are introduced to ProvMark
since there are a limited number of common provenance formats.
Module SPADE OPUS CamFlow
(Format) (DOT) (Neo4j) (PROV-JSON)
Recording 171 118 192
Transformation 74 122 128
Table 4.Module sizes (Python lines of code)
As shown in Table 4, none of the three recording or transforma-
tion modules required more than 200 lines of code (Python 3 using
only standard library imports). We initially developed ProvMark
with support for SPADE/DOT and OPUS/Neo4j combinations; thus,
adding support for CamFlow and PROV-JSON only required around
330 lines of code.
Finally, throughout the development period of ProvMark, the
candidate tools have all been updated and include new features
and behaviour. Over time, we have updated ProvMark to react to
changes in both SPADE and CamFlow, with few problems.
5.4 Discussion and Limitations
While we have argued that ProvMark is effective, fast enough to pro-
duce timely results, and easy to extend, it also has some limitations,
which we now discuss.
At this stage, ProvMark has only been applied to provenance
tracking at the operating-system level; in particular, for SPADE,
OPUS and CamFlow running under Linux. We believe the same
approach can be adapted to other operating systems or other layers
of distributed systems, assuming an extension to deal with nonde-
terminstic or concurrent activity as described below.
We have evaluated ProvMark using a small subset of individual
syscalls. Creating benchmarks currently takes some manual effort
and it would be helpful to automate this process to ease the task of
checking all of the possible control flow paths each syscall can take,
or even generate multi-step sequences. In addition, the analysis
and comparison of the resulting benchmark graphs requires some
manual effort and understanding.
We have shown ProvMark is capable of handling benchmark
programs with a small number of target system calls. Scaling up to
larger amounts of target activity or background activity appears
challenging, due to the NP-completeness and worst-case exponen-
tial behavior of subgraph isomorphism testing. However, for de-
terministic activity it may be possible to take advantage of other
structural characteristics of the provenance graphs to speed up
matching: for example, if matched nodes are usually produced in
the same order (according to timestamps), then it may be possible
to incrementally match the foreground and background graphs.
Lastly, ProvMark currently handles deterministic activity only.
Nondeterminism (for example through concurrency) introduces ad-
ditional challenges: both the foreground and background programs
might have several graph structures corresponding to different
schedules, and there may be a large number of different possible
schedules. It also appears neceessary to perform some kind of fin-
gerprinting or graph structure summarization to group the different
possible graphs according to schedule. We may also need to run
larger numbers of trials and develop new ways to align the different
structures so as to obtain reliable results. It appears challenging
to ensure completeness, that is, that all of the possible behaviors
are observed, especially since the number of possible schedules can
grow exponentially in the size of the program.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
This paper presents ProvMark, an automated approach to bench-
marking and testing the behavior of provenance capture systems.
To the best of our knowledge it is the first work to address the
unique challenges of testing and comparing provenance systems.
We have outlined the design of ProvMark, and showed how it helps
identify gaps in coverage, idiosyncrasies and even a few bugs in
three different provenance capture systems. We also showed that it
has acceptable performance despite the need to solve multiple NP-
complete graph matching subproblems. ProvMark is a significant
step towards validation of such systems and should be useful for
developing correctness or completeness criteria for them.
There are several directions for future work, to address the limita-
tions discussed in Section 5.4. First, additional support for automat-
ing the process of creating new benchmarks, or understanding and
interpreting the results, would increase the usefuless of the system,
as would extending it to provenance tracking at other levels, such
as distributed system coordination layers. Second, although we
have evaluated scalability uo to 10–20 target system calls, realistic
applications such as suspicious behavior analysis would require
dealing with much larger target activities and graphs. Finally, Prov-
Mark cannot deal with nondetermism, including concurrent I/O
and network actvity, and extending its approach to handle nonde-
terministic target activity is a focus of current work.
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A ProvMark Documentation
ProvMark is a fully automated system that generates system level
provenance benchmarks for different provenance collection tools
and systems, such as SPADE, OPUS and CamFlow. It is the main
tool mentioned in the paper. This section provides documentation
for how to use it and access the source code of ProvMark.
A.1 ProvMark source and release page
The source code of ProvMark is stored in a Github repository and
the link is here1. ProvMark is still undergoing development. There
are many new updates after the publication of this paper. In or-
der for the reader of this paper to use or test ProvMark with all
the features mentioned in this paper, we have provided a release
version for this Middleware submission. The link is here2. In this
release page, documentation on how to install, configure and use
the ProvMark tool has been provided. There is also a tarball with
a version of ProvMark that we are mentioning in this paper. In
addition, a set of sample results and additional experimental timing
results is provided in this page.
A.2 Directory structure of ProvMark source
benchmarkProgram Contains sample c programs for the col-
lection of provenance information of different syscalls
clingo Contains the clingo code
config Contains the configuration profile of different tool choices
for stage 1 and stage 2
documentation Contains the documentation for ProvMark
genClingoGraph Contains code to transform graph format
processGraph Contains code to handle graph comparison and
generalization
sampleResult Contains sample benchmark result on our trial
startTool Contains tools to handle provenance collecting tools
currently supported and retrieve result from them
template Contains html template for result generation
vagrant Contains vagrant files for those provenance collecting
tools currently supported
A.3 ProvMark Installation
Installing ProvMark is simple, just clone the whole git repository.
The current stable version corresponding to this paper is tagged by
tag Middleware2019. You could also directly download the source
code tarball from the release page mentioned above.
git clone https://github.com/arthurscchan/ProvMark.git
cd ProvMark
git checkout Middleware2019
A.3.1 Vagrant installation
In the vagrant folder, we have prepared the Vagrant3 script for the
three provenance collecting tools currently supported. If you have
vagrant (v2.2.2 or greater) and virtual box (v6.0 or greater) installed
in your system, you can follow the steps below to build up a virtual
environment which everything (tools and ProvMark) are installed.
1https://github.com/arthurscchan/ProvMark/
2https://github.com/arthurscchan/ProvMark/releases/tag/Middleware2019
3https://www.vagrantup.com/
A.3.2 Vagrant script for SPADE
cd ./vagrant/spade
vagrant plugin install vagrant-vbguest
vagrant up
vagrant ssh
A.3.3 Vagrant script for OPUS
cd ./vagrant/opus
vagrant plugin install vagrant-vbguest
vagrant up
vagrant ssh
To run OPUS, you also need a source or binary distribution for
the OPUS system itself, which is available here4
A.3.4 Vagrant script for CamFlow
cd ./vagrant/camflowv045
vagrant plugin install vagrant-vbguest
vagrant up
vagrant halt
vagrant up
vagrant ssh
It is necessary to reboot the VM (halt / up) so that the camflow-
enabled kernel will be used. This kernel should be highlighted as
the first entry by the boot loader but if not, it should be selected.
After the above steps, you should be given a ssh connection to
the virtual machine from which you can start ProvMark on your
chosen tools directly. Note: the installation process can take an
extended amount of time depending on your configuration.
A.4 ProvMark configuration
Configuration of ProvMark is done bymodifying the config/config.ini
file. Changing this file should not be necessary in common cases.
In the ProvMark system, the first two stages collect provenance
information from provenancee collecting tools and transform the
provenance result into a clingo graph. Different tools need differ-
ent process handling and type conversion. These configuration
parameters are stored in the config.ini file.
Each profile starts with the name and includes three settings as
follows:
stage1tool define the script (and parameter) for stage 1 han-
dling when this profile is chosen
stage2handler define which graph handler is used to handle
the raw provenance information when this profile is chosen
filtergraphs define if graph filtering is needed. The default
value for SPADE and OPUS is false and true for CamFlow.
The graph filtering is a mechanism provided by ProvMark to
filter out obviously incomplete or incorrect graphs generated
by the provenance systems. It can increase the accuracy for
the resulting benchmark, but it will decrease the efficiency.
Each profile defines one supporting tool and its configuration. If
new tools are supported in ProvMark, a new profile will be created
here.
4https://github.com/DTG-FRESCO/opus
A.5 ProvMark usage
A.5.1 Parameters
Currently Supported Tools:
spg SPADE with Graphviz storage
spn SPADE with Neo4j storage
opu OPUS
cam CamFlow
Tools Base Directory:
Base directory of the chosen tool, it is assumed that if you want to
execute this benchmarking system on certain provenance collecting
tools, you should have installed that tools with all dependencies
required by the tools. If you build ProvMark with the given Vagrant
script, the default tools base directory is shown as follows.
SPADE /home/vagrant/SPADE
OPUS /home/vagrant/opus (or where OPUS was manually in-
stalled)
CamFlow ./ (this parameter is ignored but some value must
be provided)
Benchmark Directory:
Base directory of the benchmark program.
Point the script to the syscall choice for the benchmarking process.
Number of trials (Default: 2):
Number of trials executed for each graph for generalization.
More trials will result in longer processing time, but provide a more
accurate result as multiple trials can help to filter out uncertainty
and unrelated elements and noise.
Result Type:
rb benchmark only
rg benchmark and generalized foreground and background
graph only
rh html page displaying benchmark and generalized foreground
and background graph
A.5.2 Single Execution
This command will only call a specific benchmark program and
generate benchmark with the chosen provenance system.
Usage:
./fullAutomation.py <Tools> <Tools Base Directory> <Benchmark Directory> [<Trial>]
Sample:
./fullAutomation.py cam ./ ./benchmarkProgram/baseSyscall/grpCreat/cmdCreat 2
A.5.3 Batch Execution
Automatically execute ProvMark for all syscalls currently sup-
ported. The runTests.sh script will search for all benchmark pro-
grams recursively in the default benchmarkProgarm folder and
benchmark them one by one. It will also group the final result and
post process them according to the given result type parameter.
Usage:
./runTests.sh <Tools> <Tools_Path> <Result Type>
Sample:
./runTests.sh spg /home/vagrant/SPADE rh
For more examples of the usage please refer to the documentation
provided on the release page or the README file at the parent
directory of the source code.
A.6 Sample Output
For the generation of the sample output, we have used the provided
Vagrant script to build up the environment for the three provenance
systems and execute a batch execution in each of the built virtual
machine. The following command is used in each virtual machine
respectively.
A.6.1 SPADE
./runTests.sh spg /home/vagrant/SPADE rh
A.6.2 OPUS
./runTests.sh opu /home/vagrant/opus rh
A.6.3 CamFlow
./runTests.sh cam . rh 11
The results on successful completion of this script are accessible
in finalResult/index.html.
A.6.4 Full Timing Result
From the data in Figures 5–7 we can see the time needed for Prov-
Mark to process some of the system calls using specific provenance
systems. The full list of timing result containing all system calls
included in the above batch execution can be found in the follow-
ing path inside the source tarball from the release page. They are
separated by the chosen provenance systems.
SPADE sampleResult/spade.time
OPUS sampleResult/opus.time
CamFlow sampleResult/camflow.time
Each line in those result files representing one system call execu-
tion and all parameters in each line are separated by a comma. The
first two parameters represent the provenance system and system
calls chosen for this line of result. The remaining four floating-point
numbers represent the time needed (in seconds) for each ProvMark
subsystem to process that system call (with the chosen provenance
system) in order. ProvMark will automatically time all the process
and attached a line of timing result at the end of /tmp/time.log
for each system call execution. You must have the privilege to write
to that file to get the timing result.
